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Multinational companies' (MNCs) corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs 
frequently comprise a portfolio of disconnected country-level programs or, alternatively, 
consist of blanket corporate policies that apply in the same way across the geographies 
where the company operates. Yet, the international nonmarket environment in which 
CSR programs operate is neither a completely fragmented nor a perfectly homogeneous 
one. 
Building on the concept of stakeholder-issue-networks, we develop a model that 
explicitly takes into consideration the role of geography in the characterization of a firm's 
nonmarket environment. This allows us to develop a taxonomy of nonmarket 
environments on the basis of their geographic spread and their degree of cross-border 
connectedness. We then explore the strategic and organizationai implications that 
different ideal types of (cross-border) nonmarket environments have for the development 
of international CSR policies. 
Kevwords: Corporate social responsibility; nonmarket environment; issue networks; 
social strategy; stakeholder theory, strategic issue management; 
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Introduction 
In 2003, an international consortium of companies led by BP, the British oil company, 
began construction of a 1078 mile pipeline that would carry oil from the Caspian Sea to 
the Mediterranean city of Ceyhan. The so called Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline 
would cross the borders of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey. To make this project a 
reality, BP and its partners not only had to garner the support of all three national 
governments but also that of thousands of city councils, farmers associations and 
individual landowners, and a multitude of environmental, human rights and economic 
development nongovernment organizations (NGOs) from each one of the countries. The 
magnitude of the project also attracted the attention offoreign NGOs, large and small, 
that adopted a variety of stances vis-a-vis the project. Some of them, such as The Corner 
House, Platform, or Friends of the Earth UK frontally opposed the construction of the 
pipeline. Under the umbrella of the Baku Ceyhan Campaign and in conjunction with 
some local NGOs, they carried out a protracted advocacy campaign against BP both 
along the route of the pipeline and in a variety of developed countries including the UK, 
US, and Western and Central Europe. Other local and international NGOs, by contrast, 
assumed the role of monitoring agents. As such, they gave faith of the progress -or lack 
of it- of the environmental, health, education and economic development programs that 
BP had agreed to undertake along the pipeline as part of the package of conditions 
negotiated with the national governments. Finally, a third contingent of domestic and 
international NGOs, including Mercy Corps, Care International and Save the Children, 
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were hired by the consortium to design and implement the above mentioned social 
programs. 
While the BTC pipeline was of capital importance to BP, it was only one of a 
variety of strategic projects in which the company was involved at the time. Interestingly, 
BP and some of the NGOs involved in the BTC project also interacted in the context of 
other projects of the company. However, whether the relationship established between 
BP and a these NGOs was a confrontational or collaborative varied from issue to issue. 
For example, WWF, the environmental NGO, was critical of BP with regards the BTC 
project but collaborated closely with it in a natural gas project in Tangguh, Indonesia. 
The example above is but one illustration of the increasingly complex nonmarket 
environment ofMNCs in which (1) focal events span multiple countries, (2) state and 
non-state stakeholders are located in different regions in the world, (3) activists may 
decide to apply pressure on the firm in one country to change corporate behavior in 
another, (4) firms' counterparts adopt different roles depending on the issue at stake, and 
where (5) the most common form of coordination is through loose inter-organizational 
ties. As firms are increasingly expected to provide appropriate responses to the claims put 
forth by social actors (Margolis and Walsh 2001) this is a challenge that managers and 
corporations cannot afford to ignore or simply respond to on an ad-hoc basis. 
Yet, despite the dramatic change in the nonmarket environment ofMNCs in the 
last two decades (Prakash 2002), international nonmarket strategy remains firmly 
anchored in a vision ofthe world where the (almost) only relevant nonmarket actors are 
national governments, and where issues of social concern are either global in scope (for 
example: climate change or human rights) or local and neatly bound within country 
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borders. Both extremes reflect disregard for the wide variation of institutional, cultural, 
economic and geographic contexts (Ghemawat 2003) in which the firm interacts with its 
stakeholders, and for the fact that stakeholders located in different countries increasingly 
engage in both collaborative activities with one another in order to increase the 
effectiveness of their claims against a company or group of companies (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). 
In this paper we seek to bring the role of location, both in terms of context 
variation and in terms of stakeholder cross-border interaction, to the forefront of 
nonmarket environment conceptualization. If, as a number of scholars have pointed out 
(Brammer and Pave !in 2006), the effectiveness of ICSR programs hinges on how well 
they respond (or fit) with the environment in which the firm operates, it follows that a 
proper characterization of the company's international nonmarket environment is an 
indispensable first step in the development of successful ICSR strategies. 
In order to achieve this goal, we draw from and broaden the literatures on 
nonmarket strategy (Baron 1995) and on international corporate social responsibility 
(ICSR). More concretely, we take as starting point the concept of"strategic" CSR and 
explore how explicitly taking into account the role played by geography enhances our 
understanding of the functioning of a firm's nonmarket environment. The term "strategic 
CSR" was arguably coined by Baron (2001) to reflect that companies compete for 
socially responsible customers by explicitly linking their social contribution to product 
sales. Such strategies can be both proactive (exploiting CSR practices to gain 
competitive advantages) and defensive (preempting potentially damaging stakeholder 
pressures). Me Williams, Siege!, and Wright (2006) expanded on Baron's view and 
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asserted that a company's social practices are integrated into its business and corporate-
level strategies. 
In our view, ICSR can be considered as one, and an often overlooked, dimension 
of an overall nonmarket strategy. Hence, the firm level behavior that we study in this 
paper includes not only CSR programs but also more conventional elements of 
nonmarket strategies (e.g. lobbying). Further, the nonmarket environment we consider 
incorporates social and political actors, as well as the interactions between the two. 
Hence, in this paper we refer to ICSR strategies as the nonmarket strategies addressed 
toward social and political actors (and their networks) that seek to position the firm as a 
positive social actor (or defend against characterizations as a negative social actor) for 
purposes of advancing the firm's strategic goals across national borders. 
We begin by assessing the three main frameworks traditionally used to 
characterize the nonmarket environment of firms. We then advance the argument that 
location must also be fully incorporated into any model of!CSR in the context of 
nonmarket environments. Building on the historical and contemporary IB literature, we 
define location as a multidimensional construct and suggest that it bears on the 
development of!CSR in two important ways. First, by allowing firms (and their 
stakeholders) to leverage advantages from the specific geographic, cultural, political, and 
social dimensions of a given location, and second, by affording a platform for 
coordination and linkages with other units of a focal organization in different locations. 
Taking stock of the three nonmarket frameworks and the literature on location as it 
relates to transnational actor and policy networks, we then build a model of firm's 
international nonmarket environments based on the notion of stakeholder-issue-networks 
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that explicitly recognizes and incorporates the locational aspects of an MNC's nonmarket 
environment. Using our conceptual framework, we propose a typology of cross-border 
nonmarket environments based upon their geographic spread and the density of cross-
country ties among the firm's stakeholders. Finally, we explore the strategic and 
organizational implications that each ideal type of nonmarket environment has for the 
development of an ICSR strategy. 
Three Approaches to Business-in-Society: Issues, Stakeholders, and Networks 
Three main perspectives have dominated the debate in the Business and Society literature 
both at the analytical and the normative levels. The first one, the Strategic Issue 
Management school (Ansoff 1980), takes the concept of issue as the organizing principle 
of the relationships between firms and their nonmarket environment (NME). Issues are 
viewed as "gaps between stakeholder expectations and an organization's policies, 
performance, products or public commitments" (Buchholz 1988). Issue management, 
therefore, is the process by which firms close this gap between expectations and reality. 
This can be done by either changing the firm's behavior or by altering stakeholders' 
expectations and perceptions about the behavior of firms. 
A second approach, Stakeholder Theory (Freeman 1984; Donaldson and Preston 
1995), is rooted in the idea that firms must respond to the claims of a variety of 
stakeholders whose actions -or inactions- can affect firm performance. Defining "who is a 
stakeholder, and what is a stake?" has been one of the key concerns of scholars in this 
school of thought that has resulted in a "maddening variety [of ways in which] questions 
of stakeholder identification might be answered" (Mitchell, Agle et al. 1997). 
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A third perspective, much more recently developed, has applied a social-network 
approach to the study of a firm's nonmarket environment. Authors adopting this 
perspective (Rowley 1997; Mahon, Heugens et al. 2003), have focused not only on the 
attributes of the stakeholders but also on the relationships that a firm establishes with its 
stakeholders and the relationships that these stakeholders establish amongst themselves. 
Their main contribution has been to highlight that the structural position occupied by 
each actor in an organizational field may significantly influence its opportunities, 
constrains and behaviors (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz 1994). Table I below, an 
adaptation from Mahon, Heugens et al (2003) provides a stylized summary of these three 
perspectives. 
--- Insert Table I here---
Although Baron (1996) highlights the 4 I's: issues, interests (stakeholders), 
institutions, and information and Freeman (1984) addresses actors as well as relations 
(nodes and linkages), much of the 'Business and Society' literature has tended to 
emphasize one of these perspectives over the others with the result that "to date, the field 
of non-market strategy has little to offer in the way of a truly integrated perspective [ ... ] 
even though it is widely accepted that stakeholder behavior and issue evolution are 
delicately intertwined" (Mahon, Heugens et. al., (2003). 
Other complicating realities that current models tend to overlook relate to the fact 
that one same firm may be involved in multiple issues at the same time (Mahon, Heugens 
et al. 2003), and that interaction between these issues may result in deviation from what 
would be the 'normal path' in the issue's life cycle (Bigelow, Fahey et al. 1991; Bigelow, 
Fahey et al. 1993). Similarly, it is a frequent occurrence that powerful secondary 
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stakeholders are involved in several of the issues that a firm is trying to address at any 
one point in time, and that their stance with regards the behavior of the firm may vary on 
an issue by issue basis rather than supporting or opposing the actions of the firm across 
the board. While some authors, particularly of the network approach (Rowley 1997, 
Mahon, Heugens et al2003, Easley and Lenox, 2006), have attempted to incorporate 
some of these real world complexities in their models, none that we know of fully 
captures the multiple interactions that occur between a focal firm, the multiple issues in 
which it is involved, and the various networks of stakeholders whose claims it needs to 
address: 
When considering business-societal interactions in the global business 
environment, one final- and critical- shortcoming of current models resides on their 
scant attention to the role played by geography. Indeed, most theoretical and empirical 
work in this field tends to portray nonmarket actors as extremely local players. For 
example, Baron (1995) explicitly states that "global or international nonmarket strategy 
seems unlikely to be successful because strategies must take into account the institutions 
in whose context non market issues are addressed, the configuration of interests in a 
country, and other country-specific actors". Other empirical studies assume this much by 
circumscribing their object of study to a particular country or area, or by simply ignoring 
the pressure exerted on the focal firm by actors located in a foreign country. 
This relative indifference for the influence oflocation in the relation between 
firms and nonmarket actors that has characterized the business and society literature 
stands in stark contrast with work done in the field of international relations. Indeed, in 
the last decade a vast literature concerned with such issues as transnational advocacy 
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networks (Dahan, Doh et al. 2006), global civil society (Y aziji and Doh 2009) or the 
differences between 'northern' and "southern" nonprofit organizations (Lindenberg and 
Dobel1999) has developed. This body of work suggests that assuming away the role of 
geography is a gross oversimplification of the functioning ofnonmarket environments, 
and that presuming that all relevant relationships between a firm and its stakeholders are 
neatly contained within the boundaries of a country is simply incorrect. 
For these reasons, we suggest that effective ICSR strategies need to be grounded 
on a more nuanced and finely variegated characterization of a firm's nonmarket 
environment. A characterization that should integrate the main elements of the three 
approaches described above, and that, in addition, should situate location in the front and 
center of the ICSR strategy formulation process. 
Location and Nonmarket Strategy in a Globalized World 
The concept oflocation is central to international business activity, even as the world 
purportedly is becoming "flatter" (Friedman 2005). The role played by location in the 
development of a firm's international competitive advantage is one of the long standing 
concerns in the field ofiB. At the risk of oversimplifYing, this branch of the IB literature 
points at two main implications of location on firm competitiveness. First, firms may gain 
access to strategic resources by virtue of being born or located in a particular geographic 
area. Since access to these strategic resources is key to ensuring their international 
competitive advantage, identifYing where these resources are located, gaining access to 
them, and leveraging them across country borders is one of the fundamental objectives of 
MNCs top managers. On occasion, it is not possible or cost effective for a firm to set up 
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operations where a particularly valuable resource is located. In these situations, firms will 
try to gain indirect control of such resources by engaging in collaborative behaviors with 
organizations with established presence in that location that do have access to them. In 
sum, gaining control of strategic resources wherever they are located, whether directly or 
through joint ventures, and leveraging them across country borders is one of the 
fundamental elements ofMNCs international strategy. 
Central to this literature, and to our argument, is that location-based resources 
need to be conceptualized very broadly, including natural and human resources, cultural 
norms and values, relational capitai, and legal and economic institutions. Although in his 
infamous OLI (Ownership, Location and Internalization) framework, Dunning (1977) 
defined location somewhat narrowly to refer to the physical attributes of a given place, he 
subsequently and increasingly broadened the conceptualization to include these 
intangible factors as the international business field turned its attention to the cultural, 
political, legal, and social dimensions of location and how they affect the suitability of a 
given location for a particular activity (Dunning 1998; Dunning 2009). Moreover, the 
emergence of"alliance capitalism" implies a more flexible and relational dimension of 
location, one that allows for "combinative capabilities" emerging from the integration of 
different locational attributes by alliance partners situated in different places (Dunning 
1995). 
Hence, in the context of this paper, location is conceived not only in geographic 
terms, as in a given combination oflongitude and latitude on a map, but also as a 
particular configuration of cultural, economic and institutional arrangements (Ghemawat 
2007) that bear a direct influence on the opportunities and constraints of inter-
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organizational life. In other words, location cannot be viewed as just one point in space, 
but as a spatial condition and a set of relationships that is imbued with a unique 
configuration of natural and man-made properties shaping the behavior and the 
opportunity set of the organizations located there, as well as its interactions with other 
like organizations in other locations. 
In the opening example, BP was afforded privileged access to resources located in 
the UK as a result of its incorporation in that country and by being deeply embedded in 
its social, political and economic fabric. At the most basic level, these resources would 
include preferential access to natural resources in the North Sea, easy access to domestic 
and international capital markets, given London's preeminence as a financial center, or 
access to a large pool of highly educated professionals in some of the best professional 
and liberal arts colleges in the world. Equally important, though, are the strategic 
resources the company may derive from British institutions, including the protection 
granted by its regulatory framework, the financial and economic discipline required to 
operate in the UK, or the considerable sway that the British Department of Foreign 
Affairs enjoys around the world. 
A second implication is that consideration of organizations in terms of their 
location implies a corollary of distance. That is, being 'pinned' to a particular place, 
determines how close or how far from resources associated with other locations a firm is. 
Here too, it is important that we think of distance between countries not only in terms of 
distance in spatial terms but also in terms of the cultural, economic and institutional 
differences between two places (Kostova and Roth 2002; Ghemawat 2007). In terms of 
organizational strategy, distance poses two related dilemmas for firms. First, while 
lliPage 
entering distant countries is more costly and risky than entering proximate ones (Zaheer . ' -"} 
1995), it also allows firms to tap into a very different pool of resources than the ones 
available in their home markets, offering them the potential to strengthen their 
competitive advantage (Ghemawat 2003). Secondly, while operating in multiple locations 
increases tremendously the managerial complexity of the firm, it also renders the 
company more resilient to the potential shocks that the firm might experience in any one 
place. In the case of BP, operating in some 80-odd countries, allows the firm to tap into a 
broad variety of resources and to diversify its risk but at the price of having to manage 
the tensions that inevitably arise from operating in countries with different, and 
sometimes conflicting, laws, cultures, histories and geopolitical interests. 
While the effect of location has been extensively studied in the context of the 
international market environment of firms, we argue that it is equally relevant when it 
comes to conceptualizing their nonmarket environment. More concretely, we propose that 
location plays a fundamental role in determining the nature of claims stakeholders place 
on firms, the ways these claims are framed, the strategies stakeholders are likely to 
employ, and the amount and types of resources that they are able to mobilize in the 
pursuit of their objectives. In terms of the example above, it is not irrelevant for BP that a 
considerable proportion ofBTC-related stakeholders are powerful NGOs located in 
continental Europe, the US or the UK. Indeed, being headquartered in these locations 
grants these organizations access to unique resources that are not available to outsiders. 
For example, in addition to having access to a broad pool of financial resources in 
the form of members or foundation money, these organizations can exert pressure on (or 
support for) BP's endeavors in the project by using their countries' legal systems, 
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something foreign nationals might not do, or by directly lobbying the company's bankers 
and financers on their way to work. Importantly, just as companies do enter collaborative 
agreements when they cannot access resources located in foreign countries directly, 
stakeholders engage in cross-border collaborative agreements to leverage the local 
resources that each has access to in order to influence corporate behavior (Keck and 
Sikkink 1998). In the BTC case, activists opposed to the project created the 'Baku-
Ceyhan Campaign' (http://www.baku.org.ukl), an international coalition of activist 
NGOs whose members exchanged information about the project, coordinated actions 
both along the BTC route and in their home countries, and served as a information hub 
for global audiences. 
In addition to the anecdotal evidence provided by the BTC example, we find 
considerable support for our proposition in recent studies on north-south NGOs and on 
transnational networks of advocacy. These studies show the deep influence that location 
has on a broad variety of aspects of stakeholder behavior. Regarding the nature of claims, 
southern NGOs have been found to be primarily concerned about collective interests 
while northern NGOs focus more on individual human rights (Smith, Pagnuco et al. 
1998; Harris-Curtis, Marleyn et al. 2005). Regarding preferred strategies, northern NGOs 
are seen as privileging domestic and international policy making, while southern NGOs 
are more likely to pursue their goals by means of grassroots pressure (Ahmad 2006). 
There is also an abundant body of work comparing 'rich' northern NGOs with 'poor' 
southern ones (Lindenberg and Dobel 1999) and the implications derived from such 
disparity to organizational behavior and outcomes. 
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As we consider these relational attributes of location, the contemporary actor 
network and transnational policy network literature is relevant in that it has demonstrated 
how activists are able to leverage their local capabilities and resources and integrate those 
with others to place pressure on corporations to engage in more socially responsible 
behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Although transnational policy networks -self 
organizing groups that coordinate a growing number of public (decision-makers) and 
private (interest groups) actors for the purpose of formulating and implementing public 
policies (Konig 1998)- were originally conceived as naturally involving governments, 
Heclo (1978) challenged this interpretation and offered an alternative- and increasingly 
realistic- notion , namely the "issue network" which still corresponds to a political 
subsystem but is much less stable that the prior conceptualizations in terms of 
membership and duration. 
A related contemporary research stream has explored the emergence of "private" 
regulation, which encompasses voluntary commitment among various stakeholder, as an 
increasingly important mechanisms for disciplining corporate behavior around the globe. 
Recognizing that the relative influence of the state in the global economy is diminished 
with other actors- notably MNCs and NGOs assuming relatively greater roles- Cashore 
(2002) and others have explored the changing nature of global governance in light of the 
emergence of non-state market-driven (NSMD) regulations, often initiated by NGOs 
working in consort across borders, as alternatives or complements to traditional state-
level regulation. 
In sum, 'where' a firm's stakeholders are located is of fundamental importance to 
ICSR strategies for two reasons. First, as a source of strategic resources, location matters 
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because of its strong influence on what issues stakeholders care about, how they frame 
their claims, what means of engaging firms they deem legitimate and effective and, 
fundamentally, what kinds of resources and in what amounts they might be able to 
mobilize. Secondly, location in terms of'distance between stakeholders' matters 
because it reflects the potential they have to leverage locally-based resources across 
borders in pursuit of their goals. As a corollary, location-as-distance also matters to firms 
because it reflects the extent to which claims placed on the firm by different stakeholders 
are likely to be at odds with one another and, as a result, the extent to which customized 
or broad approaches to addressing those claims are more appropriate. 
An Integrated Model of the International Nonmarket Environment 
In order to integrate the three perspectives ofbusiness-societal relationships summarized 
above while fully recognizing and incorporating the role of!ocation and relational 
connections across geographic space, the starting point of our model builds on the the 
concept of 'issue-network' (Heclo 1978; Sikkink 1993). More concretely, we define an 
issue-network as the network of relationships between-afocalfirm and a collective of 
societal stakeholders, as well as the relationships that these same stakeholders weave 
among themselves in response to an issue directly involving the focal firm. Since most 
firms are simultaneously involved in multiple stakeholder issues (Bigelow, Fahey et al. 
1993), and ICSR operates within a broader nonmarket environment, we can then define a 
company's nonmarket environment as the aggregation of issue-networks that the firm 
needs to address at any one point in time. 
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Understanding the functioning and power of this model requires that we start by 
describing in some detail the main characteristics of its basic building blocks: issues, 
stakeholders, and relationships. 
Issues. What constitutes an 'issue' is probably one of the most contested concepts 
in the business and society literature. For example, defines issues as "social problems 
[ ... ] requiring managerial attention when they are defined as being problematic to society 
or to an institution within society" (Kingdon 1984). Ansoff(l980), describes them as 
"forthcoming development[ s ] .. .likely to have an important impact on the ability of the 
enterprise to meet its objectives". 
These commonly accepted definitions of 'issue' are problematic on two accounts. 
On the one hand, conceptualizing issues as social problems, developments or trends 
opens the door to defining an issue in terms that are too broad for meaningful managerial 
intervention -such as trying to address the issues of human rights or global warming. On 
the other extreme, issues might be defined at such a micro level that it might make 
coherent organization-wide responses unfeasible. A second limitation of the standard 
definitions above is that they portray issues as something inherently threatening for firms. 
This need not be the case. As an increasing number of instances of collaboration between 
firms and communities and NGOs show, the outcome of an issue may turn up to be 
beneficial for both sides. In order to sidestep both problems, we propose that issues are 
most effectively operationalized as concrete instances or events such as a project, a 
product, or a firm policy that generate gaps between the expectations of a number of 
stakeholders and the firm's behavior. Therefore, mapping the non-market environment of 
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a firm requires that we start by identifying these focal points around which non-market 
action is likely to take place. 
Stakeholders. The second element in our model are the firm's stakeholders. 
Following Freeman ( 1984) we define them as parties that can affect or be affected by the 
actions of a firm. Centrally for our model, not all stakeholders are interested, much less 
involved, in all of the issues the firm needs to address. The various collectives of 
stakeholders bound by a particular issue will be referred to in our model as "issue-
networks". The concept of issue-network was developed and primarily employed in the 
political science (Heclo 1978) and public policy domains (Skok 1995). Issue networks 
have been defined as "individuals and groups with shared knowledge about some aspect 
of public policy" (Heclo 1978) or "a network of organizations that include NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations and private foundations[ ... ] driven by shared values or 
principled ideas" (Sikkink 1993). In sum, an issue-network is a set of organizations that 
share a common interest or concern regarding a specific issue. 
As pointed by Rowley (1997), traditional stakeholder theory approaches are built 
on the principle that organizational attributes of stakeholders are the main factor 
determining their power and influence over firms or over other stakeholders. The most 
common stakeholder attributes used in empirical and theoretical work include the type of 
relationship they have with the focal firm (primary or secondary stakeholders), the size of 
the organizations, the human, financial and informational resources they can mobilize, 
their social capital, their reputation, their attitude (positive or negative) towards the focal 
firm, and whether they engage primarily in advocacy or service delivery, among very 
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many others. Shockingly, one organizational attribute that rarely makes this list is the / 
actual location of residence of the stakeholder. 
While this oversight may be due in some cases to the empirical context of the 
study, we contend that 'where' a firm's stakeholders are located is a critical stakeholder 
attribute that needs to be added to the list above if we are to develop effective ICSR 
strategies. As explained in the previous section, the relevance of location stems from the 
fact that some of the most important sources of leverage of nonmarket actors over firms 
is tightly linked to their being embedded in the socio-political fabric of a particular 
locale. 
Relationships. In social networks analysis, a tie reflects some kind of 
interdependence between the two nodes it links. As such, we can think of ties as 
reflecting a broad spectrum of relationships, ranging from sentiments of friendship or 
animosity, to exchanges of information or other resources, to involvement in a particular 
issue or arena. 
As a number of authors in the network tradition described above have pointed out, 
it is necessary to go beyond the use of networks as metaphors (Smith 1980) and use them 
as analytical devices to inform action. In order to do so, it is imperative to tightly define 
the kind of relationship being measured, and to establish the presence or absence of such 
kind of tie between every potential pair of actors in the specific setting under 
consideration. Ideally, analysts should also strive to determine the directionality of the tie 
(unidirectional or reciprocal) and its strength. 
For the purposes of this paper, we will determine that there is a tie between any 
two nodes (firm to stakeholder or stakeholder to stakeholder) if "they engage directly 
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with one another in regards to a particular issue generated by the focal firm". Note that 
this is a broad definition of relationship and that depending on the research question at 
hand it would be possible to raise the level of specificity and define the relationship in 
terms of, for example, "transfer of financial resources or information in connection with a 
specific issue", "organization of a demonstration to oppose the focal firm with regards a 
particular issue", or "development of part of a CSR project in collaboration with the focal 
firm to address a given problem". 
The Complementary Role of Location. Having described the building blocks of 
our model, it is now necessary to explain how including locational considerations 
provides a more complete picture of cross-border nonmarket environments than existing 
conceptual models do. It does so in three ways. First, by explicitly specifying the 
stakeholder attribute 'place of origin' or 'place where it operates' we can assess the 
geographic concentration oftl1e focal firm's stakeholders and produce a rough estimation 
of the location-bound resources available to them. In the BP example, observing the 
location of origin of the firm's stakeholders reveals a considerable spread across 
countries. While the vast majority are located in developing countries and have limited 
access to financial, human, or institutional resources, a much more limited number of 
secondary stakeholders from developed countries (among which are some developed 
country governments) have access to important sources oflocation bound resources that 
they can use to support or oppose the company's actions. 
As a second step, we can overlay this stakeholder-level information with 
information on the issues each stakeholder is involved in. This would allow us to not only 
identify the geographic scope of a particular issue and the overall level of stakeholder 
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involvement in each country but would also allow us to identifY the degree to which 
stakeholders are involved in a single or in multiple issues. Following with the example 
above, thinking in terms of issue-networks, allows us to see the very different nature of 
the three issues that BP needs to address. On the one hand, the Alaskan pipeline project 
involves, almost exclusively, stakeholders located in the USA and Canada whose 
concerns are centered on the environmental impact that the construction of the proposed 
pipeline would entail for the Arctic flora and fauna. 
By contrast, the Tangguh issue-network involves a mix of regional stakeholders 
as well as some NGOs based in the UK. In this case, in addition to making sure that BP's 
development of the giant gas field will not endanger the pristine natural environment on 
which it is located, the firm's stakeholders are centrally concerned with the impact that 
the project will have on the primitive economic make-up of the region. Finally, the BTC 
issue-network is the most complex of the three, in terms of the types of stakeholders 
involved, their geographic spread, and the nature of the issues at stake. 
In contrast with the previous two issue-networks, the geostrategic importance of 
the Caspian Sea, where the oil feeding the pipeline is produced, and the volatile nature of 
the areas that the pipeline goes through, raises concerns in multiple areas, including 
environmental impact, economic development, respect for human rights, and the balance 
of power between some of the world's most powerful countries. In addition to better 
defining the nature ofthe claims and the strategic resources that the firm stakeholders can 
mobilize in the pursuit of their interests, thinking of BP's nonmarket environment in 
terms of issue-networks also allows us to identifY the degree to which stakeholders 
overlap across issues. In this case, three nongovernment organizations based in the UK, 
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The Corner House, Platform, and Friends of the Earth-UK, are involved in all three issue 
networks. As pointed by Mares and Rogers (2008), this is of relevance given that 
stakeholders involved in multiple issues might leverage their strong position with regards 
one issue to force firms make concessions in a different arena. 
Our conceptual model allows for a third level of specificity by superimposing 
information about the relationships established among the firms' stakeholders on the 
issue-network map. Accounting for the relationships among stakeholders allows 
identification of not only the overall structure and density of the network and the 
centrality of specific players (as in Rowley 1997) but, importantly, may help us also 
identifY how tightly linked stakeholders from different countries are. This type of 
information can also be used to identifY stakeholders that bridge cross-border structural 
holes (Burt 1992). Irrespective of the resources over which these actors have direct 
control, their influence in mobilizing actors across borders and coordinating action 
against or in favor of the firm is likely to be of fundamental importance. 
Returning again to the BP example, we can appreciate considerable differences in 
the structure of relationships between BP's Alaskan and BTC issue-networks. In the 
former, the company has to address the issues raised by pro-drilling activists represented 
by Arctic Power, a grassroots organization that aggregates the interests of various local 
industry associations, chambers of commerce, and local governments, as well as claims 
of a much more diffuse array of groups opposing the development of ANWR on 
environment concerns and respect of aboriginal people's rights. By contrast, the structure 
of relations in the BTC issue-network is characterized by a well-defined and coordinated 
resistance and a much more diffused local level support for the project. Tellingly, the 
211Page 
main grassroots organizations opposing the project and organizing local and international 
level campaigns against BP are not located in any of the countries the pipeline crosses, 
but in its home country, the UK, where these organizations can use British institutions to 
challenge the actions of the company at home and abroad. 
In sum, we suggest that in order to fully understand the complexity and 
uniqueness of a company's cross-border nonmarket environment, it is appropriate to 
combine the insights of existing models and explicitly consider the role location plays in 
relation to issues, stakeholders, and relationships and to incorporate the dynamic 
interactions among these variables across geographic space. 
--- Insert Figure I Here ---
International Nonmarket Environments: Strategic and Organizational Implications 
Having developed our conceptual model, in this section of the paper we use it to provide 
some normative insights that could guide how MNCs effectively and efficiently deploy 
their resources in order manage their nonmarket environment. In line with strategy 
scholars (Powelll992; Naman and Slevin 1993; Peterafand Reed 2007), international 
business (Cavusgil and Zou 1994; Hultrnan, Robson et al. 2009), and stakeholder theory 
(Brammer and Pavelin 2006) traditions, we suggest that a firm's level of success will 
depend on the fit between the characteristics of its unique cross-border non market 
environment and the firm's international nonmarket strategy. In other words, a company 
will thrive to the extent that it develops an appropriate response to the pressures of its 
environment. 
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As noted above, the role and importance of the state in international nonmarket 
strategy is widely documented; here we seek to build on the growing literature on the 
increasing role ofNGOs (Y aziji and Doh 2009) within the issue network framework and 
how they influence and affect firms both directly and via their relationships with state 
actors (Doh and Teegen 2002). 
Spread and connectedness of cross-border nonmarket environments. In 
assessing strategic fit, we start by drawing from standard IB logic by proposing that a 
firm's cross-border nonmarket environment be described along two dimensions: its 
geographic spread and its cross-border connectedness. Geographic spread evaluates the 
extent to which a firm's relevant nonmarket environment is concentrated in a few 
geographic areas or dispersed across many countries. It is important to emphasize here 
that by conceiving a firm's nonmarket environment in terms of stakeholder-issue-
networks, its geographic spread may considerably differ from the firm's competitive or 
operational footprint. For example, ifthere is no gap between a firm's behavior and its 
stakeholders' expectations (i.e.: there is no 'issue') in a given country, the relevance of 
that location in nonmarket terms is extremely limited. By contrast, the geographic scope 
of a stakeholder-issue-network may very well expand beyond the specific countries 
where the company operates, as the BTC case exemplifies. 
A firm's nonmarket geographic spread can be operationalized in a variety of 
ways using the framework defined above. A simple measure might involve merely 
counting the number of countries in which the firm has stakeholders. A more complex 
indicator might be the development of a Herfindhal-like index indicating the degree to 
which the nonmarket environment of a firm is highly concentrated or widely dispersed 
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across countries. While our conceptual model allows for the development of a broad 
variety of indices, the appropriateness of one or another will, obviously, depend on the 
nature of the research question under consideration. 
Consistent with the concept oflocation developed above, high levels of 
nonmarket geographic spread implies that a firm's stakeholders will have access to a 
broad variety, although not necessarily in large amounts, of resources. It also implies that 
the nature of the claims placed on the firm may be very diverse and potentially 
conflicting with one another. In both cases, the level of managerial complexity is likely to 
increase as the scope of a firm's nonmarket environment expands. On the positive side, a 
firm's exposure to multiple cultural, institutional, economic, and geographic nonmarket 
environments implies heightened opportunities for learning and innovation (Zahra, 
Ireland et al. 2000; Doz, Santos et al. 2002), and for the development of distinct 
nonmarket capabilities that the firm may leverage across countries. 
In contrast with the concept of nonmarket geographic spread, a firm's degree of 
cross-border connectedness measures the extent to which a firm's issue networks span 
country borders. In other words, it evaluates whether the relationships of a firm's issue-
networks link stakeholders located in different countries or if, by contrast, each issue-
network is neatly circumscribed within the borders of a single country. In the BTC 
example, not only the company's stakeholders were spread among very many countries 
but they had also established a very peculiar pattern of cross-country relationships -with 
a few NGOs located in the UK acting as information hub, brokering resources, and 




As with the previous construct, cross-border connectedness can be operationalized 
in a number of ways: from simply counting the number of cross-border relationships or 
calculating the density of cross-border ties of a firm's nonmarket environment, to 
developing measures of cross-border centrality or cross-border structural holes. Also as 
before, the specific measure will depend on the research question we intend to address. 
Whereas the concept of geographic spread intends to reflect the variety of 
institutional environments that a firm will need to respond to, the concept of cross-border 
connectedness measures the extent to which these environments are linked to one 
another. Where cross-border connectedness is nonexistent, firms can address the specific 
claims of their issue-networks independently of one another and develop highly context-
specific responses for each one. In cases where cross-border connectedness is high, a 
more systemic approach is required given that local actions (or inactions) may easily 
have global implications. 
International non market profiles; strategic and organizational implications. 
While the international nonmarket reality of most firms probably falls along a continuum 
in both measures, for analytical simplicity we propose a typology of cross-border 
nonmarket environments based on crossing both dimensions and assuming they can only 
take one of two values: high and low. Thus defined, a firm's international nonmarket 
environment may present one of four configurations: high spread-high connectedness, 
high spread-low connectedness, low spread-high connectedness, and low spread- low 
connectedness. As developed below, each of these ideal types presents firms with distinct 
sets of challenges that require specific strategic and organizational responses. 
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Low spread, low international connectedness. Environments characterized by 
low levels of geographic dispersion and cross-border connectedness present moderate 
levels of added complexity relative to the base-case of purely domestic nonmarket 
environments. Indeed, while in this scenario a firm's stakeholders have access to a 
broader variety of resources and the firm may need to respond to a broader variety of 
claims, low levels of connectedness make the cross-border leverage of those resources by 
stakeholders a rare occurrence. This type of environment is normally associated to 
companies in their early phases of internationalization that operate in not particularly 
sensitive (Miles 1987; Rowley and Berman 2000) industries. 
The pressures placed on firms by this type of environment require that they 
develop some level of location-specific nonmarket expertise in order to properly respond 
to the specific requests placed upon the firm in each country. Because of the low levels of 
cross-border connectedness, however, the firm's responses can be highly customized to 
the institutional characteristics of each country and do not require particularly high levels 
of cross-country coordination. Organizationally, the amount of resources required to 
address the nonmarket environment in each country will depend on the number and 
nature of the claims on the firm in that country, the number and power of the stakeholders 
involved, and the structure of (within country) relationships they establish. The relative 
independence of the nonmarket environments that the firm confronts in each country also 
calls for limited levels of cross-border coordination and alignment mechanisms. 
Frequently, units or individuals charged with the management of nonmarket 
environments in each country report directly to the country manager and have limited 
interactions with their functional counterparts in other countries. 
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Low spread, high international connectedness. In contrast with the previous 
scenario, when strong ties among stakeholders located in different countries are present 
firms need to respond to their claims in a much more systemic manner. Nonmarket 
·environments of this kind frequently arise when the focal event is geographically located 
close to a country border and affects individuals or groups on both sides of the border, or 
when a socially or environmentally sensitive project is carried out by firms in different 
countries. 
Continuing with examples from the oil industry, a situation of this kind arose 
when a consortium of oil firms operating in Ecuador decided to build the Oleoducto de 
Crudos Pesados (OCP), Pipeline of Heavy Crudes in Spanish, with financing from the 
German bank West LB. West LB is partly owned by the German state of North Rhine-
Westfalia that, at the time, was governed by the German Green Party. Concerned 
environmentalist groups in Ecuador contacted German NGOs tightly connected with the 
green party and both groups started to exchange information about the potential impacts 
of the project and the nature of the involvement ofthe bank. A few months later, 
environmental groups staged coordinated advocacy campaigns in both countries aimed at 
pressuring the project's partners and governments to stop the project. And when this 
failed, they engaged both the OCP consortium and the bank to make sure that the pipeline 
would not present a danger to the delicate ecosystem of the Amazonian forest it would 
cross. While the nonmarket environment of the OCP consortium was not geographically 
very spread, the tight links between the activists in both countries meant that country-
specific responses would not satisfY the claims of the firm's stakeholders. 
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The OCP example highlights some of the strategic imperatives of firms operating 
in low geographic spread and high connectedness environments. As in the previous 
scenario, firms will need to gain considerable knowledge about the functioning of 
nonmarket actors and institutions in each country. Also as before, the more distant, in the 
multidimensional sense of distance developed above, the countries the higher the 
challenge and the more substantive the resources firms will need to employ to develop 
such expertise. Under these conditions, however, identifYing the actors or fora that serve 
as liaison between the stakeholders in the various countries will be of critical importance. 
Indeed, understanding the structure of the issue-networks in each country and of the 
mechanisms that link them will be of crucial importance for firm managers to develop an 
accurate understanding of the claims placed upon the firm, of the distinct resources 
stakeholders may mobilize in each country, and how they might leverage them across 
borders in the pursuit of their goals (Foreman 1999). 
Organizationally, the need to provide responses that simultaneously satisfy 
constituencies in multiple geographies requires a considerably higher level of 
coordination between the various units involved in the management of the nonmarket 
environment of the firm. In scenarios like the one described here, headquarters tend to 
adopt a leading role in terms of (I) framing the position of the firm with regards the 
claims of stakeholders, (2) estimate the overall impact of the various potential responses 
the company might provide, (3) allocate resources across countries, and ultimately (4) 
coordinate and monitor the firm's overall response. 
High spread, low international connectedness. This profile, depicting a broadly 
spread but highly fragmented nonmarket environment, embodies the predominant view 
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that business academics and practitioners have held about the nature of multinational 
companies' nonmarket environments in recent times. As Baron (1995) put it "a 
comprehensive global or international nonmarket strategy seems unlikely to be 
successful, however, because strategies must take into account the institutions in whose 
context nonmarket issues are addressed, the configuration of interests in a country, and 
other country-specific factors". While we question that this scenario is the only possible 
one for all multinational firms, there is abundant evidence that many of the issue-
networks of contemporary multinational firms are still neatly contained within the 
boundaries of a single country. 
Let us consider, for example, the geographic scope of the 'not-in-my-backyard' 
(NIMBY) issue-networks that constitute the nonmarket environment faced by numerous 
established multinational companies. NIMBY movements define situations in which 
groups of individuals or organizations attempt to exclude themselves from the 
consequences of policies which in general they support. Current examples of these 
movements would include the opposition to locating chemical or nuclear plants, wind 
farms, transportation improvement projects, fast food chains, and retail stores among 
many others in close proximity to one's residence. Typically, multinational firms 
operating in these industries need to respond to a broad number and variety of issue-
networks that are rarely connected to one another either nationally or internationally. 
While the issues faced by these companies have the common denominator of their 
projects being opposed by the local communities, the way these issues are framed, the 
resources commanded by stakeholders, and what is deemed legitimate firm and 
stakeholder behavior vary widely on a country by country (and even on an issue by issue) 
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basis. As a result, multinational firms in these environments need to develop local 
nonmarket expertise in a large variety of countries and will be inclined to develop local 
responses to address local stakeholders' claims. 
While it might seem that the strategic and organizational implications of this 
scenario are similar to the first one, the broader geographic footprint faced by companies 
in this case carries two important differential implications. On the one hand, the level of 
managerial complexity increases substantially. Indeed, as the geographic spread of a 
firm's nonmarket environment increases, so does the variety of institutional settings 
where it needs to develop distinct competencies, limiting the possibility to achieve 
economies of scale in the exploitation of its nonmarket resources. On the other hand, 
facing a great variety of institutional settings, allows for greater learning and innovation 
opportunities in the nonmarket domain. Specifically, as firms develop innovative 
responses to address stakeholders' claims in different contexts, they may find out their 
new approaches are transferable, to a greater or lesser extent, to other countries where 
they operate. 
For this reasons, we suggest that other things being equal, the strategic and 
organizational relevance of nonmarket management increases as the firm's nonmarket 
environment spreads to new geographies. Even though this scenario requires the 
development of!ocal solutions to the claims of!ocal stakeholders, the costs and benefits 
associated to entering new nonmarket environments may be such that they may strongly 
influence, or even trump, purely market based considerations for international expansion. 
In particular, firms may decide to expand into countries that are similar to the ones they 
already operate in (to minimize the costly development of new and radically different 
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nonmarket skills) or, alternatively, into countries that are completely different from 
where they operate (to maximize the probability of developing/capturing innovative ways 
to address nonmarket challenges). Similarly to what a number of authors have noted in 
the competitive realm (Doz, Santos et al. 2002; Lessard and Lucea 2009), cross-country 
leveraging oflessons learned in the nonmarket environment requires that firms develop a 
set of organizational mechanisms that allow them to identifY, evaluate, adapt, and diffuse 
these innovations. 
High spread, high international connectedness. Nonmarket environments 
characterized by broad geographic spreads and high levels of cross-border connectedness 
are the most challenging to manage. In these environments, not only stakeholders have 
access to a wide-ranging spectrum of resources, but they are also potentially able to 
mobilize them in a coordinated fashion across country borders. 
As depicted in the BP case, mature multinational companies increasingly operate 
in this type of environment which some authors have characterized a "global fish bowl" 
(Blackett 2003; Savitz and Weber 2006). This circumstance has been attributed to the 
development of information and telecommunication technologies, generalized decrease 
in transportation costs, tighter economic integration, the development of a new global 
social awareness (Robertson 1992; Guillen 200 I), and, more generally, to the 
globalization of the private, government and social sectors (Prakash 2002). While we 
agree with the fact that the potential for issues and stakeholders to become international 
actors has increased as a consequence of all of these developments, it is important not to 
assume that all firms, by default, operate in a scenario like the one depicted here. Indeed, 
despite the decrease in costs associated to transferring information and other resources, or 
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to organizing international campaigns, there still remain substantial barriers that 
stakeholders need to overcome in order to globalize their claims and engage firms in a 
holistic manner. In support of this perspective, numerous studies have pointed out that the 
different logics, interests, and resources of 'northern' and 'southern' civil society groups 
frequently result in less than perfectly coordinated inter-organizational action among 
these groups when not in outright confrontation. 
Thus, keeping in mind that while operating in a globalizing world does not ways 
equate broadly spread and highly interconnected nonmarket environments, firms who do 
find themselves is such situations face a particularly complex dilemma. On the one hand, 
highly spread nonmarket environments are usually associated with a broad variety of 
issues that firms need to address and/or with large differences in the most effective way 
to address a particular issue. On the other hand, high levels of international 
connectedness mean that its actions in one country are quickly noticed and diffused 
internationally. Formulating and implementing ICSR strategies in such an environment 
requires performing a delicate balancing act that involves providing substantive response 
to the specific claims of stakeholders in each country while maintaining high levels of 
coherence, in form and content, at a cross-country level. Unlike in previous scenarios, 
failure to do so may carry important consequences at a systemic, not just local, level. In 
order to fulfil! the strategic challenge imposed by this type of environment it is crucial for 
companies to develop a deep understanding of the various local nonmarket environments 
where they operate, closely monitoring the overall structure of the relationships among its 
stakeholders, and identifYing which actors occupy particularly important positions in 
such networks. Under these circumstances, ICSR policies gain considerably in stature 
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within the organization and frequently become are intimately integrated with the firm's 
business strategy. 
Dynamic effects. In addition to the conditions we describe above, there are 
obviously dynamic and "snowball" effects associated with the growth and impact of issue 
networks and their stakeholders. For example, Bonardi and Keim (2005) propose that 
information and reputation cascades, driven by activists or nongovemmental 
organizations, can cause public policy issues to become widely salient. They propose 
strategies to prevent such issues from becoming widely salient, focusing primarily on the 
interaction between media, government policymakers and the general public. Similarly, 
the issue networks described here have the potential of coalescing in a manner to elevate 
and issue to a level that may make it difficult for a firm to manage. While we do not 
address these dynamic effects explicitly, the classification process described above is one 
mechanism that can support ICSR strategies involving identification of issues, 
stakeholders and the networks that link them, and constitute a first step in managing them 
and potentially constraining the "cascade" effects described by Bonardi and Keim (2005) 
and which were evidence in the BTC issue. 
The challenges posed by this type of nonmarket environment require resorting to 
a broad number of organizational mechanisms ranging from purely structural to the more 
informal and subtle ones (Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Among the former, we find that one 
or several members of the top management team are directly charged with the task of 
developing and deploying the firm's nonmarket resources. Typically, this requires 
organizational architectures with a central unit in charge of providing coherence to the 
response the firm gives to stakeholders' claims and foreign subsidiaries with dedicated 
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CSR teams reporting both to their country managers and to headquarters. Among the 
latter, firms increasingly resort to alignment and coordinating mechanisms such as 
formalized planning processes, the establishment of temporary or permanent task forces, 
the organization of corporate conferences, the creation of corporate universities, and even 
the functional and geographic rotation of managers. Ultimately, operating in a highly 
geographically dispersed and tightly connected environment requires ·that firms develop 
an organizational culture that satisfactorily addresses the concerns of the firm's 
(geographically dispersed) stakeholders while meeting the financial performance goals 
set by its shareholders. 
Contributions, Limitations, and Future Research 
Unique Contributions of the Model. Our model offers insights that are difficult 
to obtain from any of the established nonmarket environment conceptual approaches. 
Specifically, it establishes a clear and inextricable link between the issues a company 
needs to address, the firm; s stakeholders, and the relationships among between 
stakeholders and the firm and among stakeholders themselves. The integration of 
resource dependencies, connections acknowledged by stake holder theory and relational 
perspectives, the focus of social network theorists, represents an important step in 
evaluating the potential relevance of a particular stakeholder to a firm -<Jne of the 
fundamental questions in stakeholder theory (Wood et al). By jointly considering the 
power a stakeholder derives from its financial/human capital and its social capital 
managers will be better able to prioritize what stakeholders' claims to address and how to 
more efficiently allocate the company's resources. Operationally, this could involve 
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weighing some standard measures of the importance of an NGOs (annual budget, number 
of affiliates, etc) by some measure of network centrality. 
Secondly, it acknowledges that there is a range of codetermination between the 
issues and stakeholder networks a firm faces such that a specific company may be 
engaged with the same set of actors in multiple issues or may be dealing with a 
completely different set of actors in each one of the issues it is involved. 
Third, it allows for the common occurrence that the relationships that the firm 
establishes with a particular actor may differ in nature, sign and intensity depending on 
the issue because firms, governments and other non-market stakeholders do not engage 
with each other in a monolithic way but tend to be quite discriminating of the positions 
they take depending on each specific issue. 
Fourth, our model also acknowledges that a firm's nonmarket environment is 
formed by issues of differing potential impact that may be at different stages in their life 
cycle (Bigelow, Fahey et al. 1993). Finally, since no two firms are engaged in the exact 
same issues in the same capacity, each organization's nonmarket environment is unique 
and will have a decisive influence on its performance and chances of survival. Figure I 
provides a summary of this conceptual process. 
Limitations and Future Research. As noted above, our model does not 
explicitly consider dynamic elements. As such, giving our framework a dynamic element 
could be a potentially insightful enhancement. Recent research on the competitive 
environment of firms reveals that multinational companies operate in a world that can be 
best described as semi-globalized (Ghemawat 2003). Similarly, we have argued that we 
can no-longer think oftheir non-market environment as a completely fragmented one 
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where issues, stakeholders and the relationships they establish with the firm and among 
themselves are circumscribed to the boundaries of single countries. This transformation 
in the nature of multinational firms' nonmarket environments, caused by the increasing 
foot-looseness of governments and, very specially, civil society organizations has very 
serious strategic and organizational implications for multinational firms and one that we 
do not explicitly address in this paper. 
Conclusions. In this paper we have developed a conceptual model that not only 
merges existing characterizations of nonmarket environments, but also takes into 
consideration the locational implications derived from the fact that multinationals' 
nonmarket environments are semi-globalized. We have further illustrated the 
contributions of our model by developing a taxonomy of the types of cross-border 
nonmarket environments that a firm may encounter and have reflected on the strategic 
imperatives that each kind of nonmarket configuration places on companies. 
Despite the specific contributions this paper makes, we think this is just the 
beginning of an exciting field of enquiry. Future research might empirically test the 
prevalence of the four ideal types of nonmarket environments we propose here, as well as 
the specific forces and triggering events that result in MNCs transitioning from one of the 
quadrants in our taxonomy to another. Obviously, future studies will concern themselves 
with the relation between the specific characteristics of a multinational firm's 
international nonmarket environment and the company's social and financial 
performance. Another avenue for research involves investigating the proactiveness of 
firms in managing their nonmarket environment. Indeed, during the presentation of the 
model we have taken the firm's nonmarket environment as an exogenous. This is not the 
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case: a firm's nonmarket environment is not something that 'is out there' placing claims 
on the firm irrespectively of what the firm does in the competitive arena. A firm's 
nonmarket environment is informed, but not fully determined, by what the company does 
and, as a result, MNCs have to be thought also as strategic actors that may shape their 
nonmarket environment, to some extent, in order to improve their long term performance. 
Finally, our conceptual framework could readily be used from the perspective of civil 
society organizations and (or) individual governments. Indeed, while our focus in this 
paper has been the multinational corporation, thinking strategically from the perspective 
of civil society organizations or governments would only require slight adaptations of the 
principles developed here. 
In sum, in our globalizing world it is imperative that ICSR managers bring 
location to the front and center of their strategic planning process given the strong 
influence it will bear on how and where they will need to (internationally) deploy their 
resources for maximum effectiveness and efficiency. 
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Table 1.- Three approaches to non market cmiroumcnts (table adaJJtcd and c.x·panded from Mahon, Heugcns et al (2003)) 
MAIN CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES TO DESCRIBING THE NON MARKET ENVIRONMENT OF FIRMS 
Issue Management 'Stake holder Management Network approach 
Definition of the unit of analysis Issues are the result of gaps between "The stakeholders in a corporation are the The network- defined in terms of actors (or 
stake holder expectations and an organization's parties that can affec or be affected by the nodes) and relationships between actors. Ties 
policies, performance, products or public actions of the firm (Freeman, 1984) represent the exchange of resources 
commitments (Bucholz, 1988) (information, people, money) between nodes. 
(Mahon et al 2003) Organizational fields-
conceived as 'a set of diverse organizations 
engaged in a similar function' (Scott 2001:137). 
Primary research question Issue dynamics -how does an issue originates, Who is a stakeholder How to integrate stake holders and issues 
grows, matures and dies When/how does it matter How does network structure affect actor 
Appropriate managerial response to issues (generally firm) behavior 
Primary focus of managerial Issue evolution Stake holders (individuals, organizations) Relationships with other organizational field 
attention actors 
Criterion guiding behavior Stage in the issue life-cycle Power of the stake holder as measured by (1) Structure of the network and structural position 
resources it may mobilize, (2) legitimacy of their of each actor 
claims, (3) and urgency of their claims 
Goal Prevent formation of detrimental issues. Placate powerful stake holders- social peace- Manage one's position in the organizational 
Minimize damage once the issue has emerged. license to operate field to gain power over other actors in the 
network for productive issue resolution 
Relevance of location Generally, locational attributes of issues are Generally, locatlonal attributes of stakeholders Generally, locational attributes of networks are 
ignored or (implicitly) assumed irrelevant. are ignored or (implicitly) assumed irrelevant. ignored or (implicitly) assumed Irrelevant. 
When explicitly addressed (Baron 1995), 
stake holders are depicted as local or national 
level actors 
~---- ~ ~ 
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The two-by-two table ·above and the figures inside each cell are a graphic representation of the four 
international nonmarket environment ideal types a firm may potentially encounter. The elements that 
constitute our model are represented in the following way in the graphs: Stakeholders are represented by 
the nodes in each cell. These nodes can take two forms, circles or triangles, depending on whether they are 
associated with issue A (circles) or issue B (triangles). Further, the relationships established among 
stakeholders are depicted as the lines linking two nodes. Finally, country borders are represented by the 
vertical lines and country labels. To keep the representation as simple as possible, the links from the focal 
firm to the various stakeholders have been omitted (one could imagine an invisible line linking the eye of 
the reader -the focal finn- to each of the nodes in a cell). Also, note that the number of stakeholders, 
number of issues and pattern of relationships is essentially the same in all four scenarios. Given this setup, 
let us consider the various ideal types of nonmarket environments a firm can encounter depending on the 
level of cross border connectedness (CBC) and international spread (IS): 
1. Low CBC - Low IS -bottom left cell-: In this case the firm would need to respond to two issue-
networks, each contained within the confines of one country. As a result, IS would be limited to 
two countries and CBC would be nonexistent (there are no links from country A to country B 
2. High CBC- Low IS- upper left cell-: There is no change in IS relative to the previous scenario 
given that the nonmarket environment of the firm is still spread across two countries. However, 
there are three cross-country links in the circle issue network, and two in the triangle issue 
network. 
3. High CBC - High IS -upper right cell-: Even though the network structure is the exact same as in 
the previous case, stakeholders are now spread across four countries, increasing dramatically the 
breadth.and depth of resource pools they can potentially access, as well as the level of complexity 
of the nonmarket environment of the firm. 
4. Low CBC - High IS -lower right cell-: In this final scenario, IS remains unchanged (the 
nonmarket environment of the firm still spans four countries), but CBC drops to zero by virtue of 
the disappearance of the ties linking stakeholders in countries A and C, and countries B and D. 
Effectively, the firm can treat the situation in each of the four countries independently from one 
another although the issues it needs to address are exactly the same in some countries. 
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